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By Dorothy E. Denning
R
ecently, I was contacted by a group of researchers 
studying cyber warfare. In reading their project 
description, I was struck by one of their premises: 
“Barriers for entry to conduct activities in cyber-
space are lower than in any military domain.” I 
thought, yes, this is the conventional wisdom, 
but is it really true? What about warfare on land? While it may 
require substantial resources to assemble an army and invade a 
foreign territory, it is not hard to shoot a gun, toss a grenade, 
or start a fire – all operations that take place on land. If these 
operations are considered too individualistic or simple minded 
to be called land warfare, then is it fair to call a common cyber 
attack, say a simple denial-of-service (DoS) attack against a 
public website, cyber warfare? If the DoS attack is considered 
to be a means of cyber warfare, is it fair to compare its entry 
requirements with those for a vastly more complex army inva-
sion when the effects are dramatically different? The DoS at-
tack may shut down a communication channel on the Internet 
for awhile, but the land invasion could result in the overthrow 
of a government or the seizure of territory.
Perhaps cyber attacks seem to have a lower barrier to entry 
because they are so commonplace. Moreover, many are simple 
to perform using “point and click” software tools and easy-to-
follow scripts. Teenage “script kiddies” launch cyber attacks 
without understanding how the tools work or exactly what 
they do. But young people also join street gangs, and teens 
who are clueless about conducting DoS attacks shoot guns and 
mark gang territory with graffiti. Children who have never even 
heard of the Internet fight in war-torn areas in Africa, wielding 
weapons and killing other human beings. If one considers all 
the attacks that take place just on land – shootings, stabbings, 
beatings, muggings, robberies, arson, etc. etc., surely they are 
at least as frequent as those in cyberspace, and often as easy 
to perform.
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The objective of this essay is to explore the question of wheth-
er operations in cyberspace have a lower barrier to entry than 
operations in kinetic domains of warfare, especially land. To do 
this, two factors are considered: costs and effects. Costs reflect 
barriers to entry and cover everything needed to prepare for and 
carry out an operation. They include expenditures for weapons, 
training, tools, facilities, telecommunications, salaries, travel, 
and recruiting. They also include casualties and arrests that re-
sult from the operation. Effects are the outcomes of an operation 
and include deaths, property damage, financial losses, service 
disruptions, decisions made, and actions taken.
Costs, or barriers to entry, are then examined relative to their 
effects. In particular, an operation X in cyberspace is said to 
have a lower barrier to entry than an operation Y in another 
domain relative to effects Z if the costs of X are lower than those 
of Y in order to achieve Z. Stated another way, if a given effect 
can be achieved in cyberspace for a lower cost than in some other 
domain, then cyberspace has a lower barrier to entry for achiev-
ing that particular outcome.
The remainder of this essay examines costs and effects in 
greater depth, discusses the Estonian and Georgian cyber 
conflicts in terms of their barriers to entry, and draws some 
conclusions.
COSTS
There are several factors that contribute to a sense that the 
barriers to entry for cyber operations are lower than for other 
domains. These include remote execution, cheap and available 
weapons, easy-to-use weapons, low infrastructure costs, low risk 
to personnel, and perceived harmlessness. The following exam-
ines these factors and whether they always hold.
Remote execution. Cyber operations can be conducted re-
motely, even from the other side of the world. By comparison, 
kinetic operations generally require that personnel and equip-
Photo courtesy US Department of Defense.
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ment be physically transported to the target area. This can 
be extremely costly, such as when armed forces are deployed 
to a foreign country. If borders must be crossed illegally, it 
also can be difficult and dangerous. However, there are excep-
tions to the general rule. A particular cyber operation could 
require a physical presence at the target site, for example, 
an accomplice with inside access to the target. Speed or reli-
ability requirements could also preclude some remote attacks, 
such as from a site vulnerable to frequent network outages. 
In addition, there are kinetic operations such as the firing 
of long-range missiles that can be conducted remotely. Also, 
kinetic targets can be selected on the basis of their proximity, 
precluding the need to relocate persons and equipment. In-
stead of traveling to the US, for example, terrorists frequently 
attack US interests abroad, including embassies and military 
bases.
Cheap and available weapons. Cyber weapons are cheap and 
plentiful. Indeed, many are free, and most can be downloaded 
from the Web. Some cost money, but even then the price is 
likely to be well under $100,000. By comparison, many kinetic 
weapons, for example, fighter jets, aircraft carriers, and sub-
marines, can run into the millions or even billions of dollars. 
Again, however, there are exceptions. Custom-built software 
can cost millions of dollars and take years to develop, while 
kinetic weapons such as matches, knives, and spray paint are 
cheap and readily available.
Easy-to-use weapons. Besides being inexpensive, many cy-
ber weapons require little skill beyond that required to oper-
ate a computer and use the Internet. By comparison, members 
of armed services receive extensive training to effectively use 
kinetic weapons. But as with the other factors, the general 
rule breaks down when one takes into account complex cyber 
weapons that require advanced skills or simple kinetic weap-
ons like knives and spray paint that can be used by anyone.
Low infrastructure costs. In general, cyber operations re-
quire little infrastructure in the way of facilities and equip-
ment. Even if multiple people are involved, operations can be 
coordinated from a website, with participants accessing cy-
berspace from their residences and cyber cafés. In comparison, 
armed services generally require substantial infrastructure, 
including military bases, to sustain their activities. However, 
the generalities do not extend to complex, tightly coupled cy-
ber operations that require a team of people operating within 
a shared facility or loosely coupled kinetic operations like ri-
ots that erupt with little supporting infrastructure. 
Low risk to personnel. In general, the persons involved in 
a cyber operation may be less likely to be captured or killed 
than persons involved in a kinetic operation. In part, this is 
because it can be difficult to determine the source of a cyber 
attack, especially if the attack has used proxies and hopped 
through multiple machines. Even if the source can be deter-
mined, the persons involved may be protected from capture or 
arrest by international boundaries, especially if they are op-
erating on behalf of or with approval from their host govern-
ment. In comparison, soldiers on the ground, at sea, or in the 
air generally risk being the targets of a lethal counter-strike. 
However, those launching missiles from a remote location or 
dropping bombs from the air may be safer than cyber opera-
tors who are careless or up against a concerted effort to track 
them down. 
Perceived harmlessness. Many cyber attacks such as web 
defacements and low-level DoS attacks are perceived to be 
relatively harmless. Nobody dies and damages are not usually 
permanent. Defaced websites are quickly restored and normal 
traffic flow resumed when DoS attacks stop. Consequently, 
there may be less psychological aversion to conducting a cyber 
attack than a kinetic one, especially one that employs lethal 
weapons. A 14-year-old hacker might have no qualms about 
defacing a website, but never shoot a gun or detonate a bomb 
that would kill people or destroy property. But as with the 
other generalities, there are exceptions. A cyber attack could 
be deadly, for example, by disrupting emergency 911 systems, 
while a kinetic operation such as a peaceful street demonstra-
tion could have little or no harmful effects.
EFFECTS
In order to fairly compare the barriers to entry of a cy-
ber operation with a kinetic one, the two operations must 
have equivalent effects. However, the immediate effects of 
an operation in cyberspace look substantially different than 
in other domains. While cyber weapons destroy and block 
bits, kinetic weapons destroy property, kill people, and block 
© 2009 Lockheed Martin Corporation
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physical pathways. Moreover, because bits can be replicated 
and restored, the effects in cyberspace may be short lived in 
contrast to the permanency of death and longer-term effects 
of property damage. 
Despite these differences, it is possible to frame many ef-
fects in a generic form that is domain independent. Casting 
effects generically provides a means of formalizing what it 
means for operations is disparate domains to have comparable 
or equivalent effects. By way of analogy, a bowl of apples is 
not comparable to a bowl of oranges, but the two bowls of fruit 
can have comparable weights.
One generic metric that applies to both cyber and kinetic 
domains is financial losses. Another is disruptions of service. 
For example, cyber attacks have caused airline delays, halt-
ed train service, and shut down ATM machines – all effects 
that could be achieved with bombs or even just the threat of 
bombs. 
Although most cyber attacks do not damage physical prop-
erty or result in death, those that do can be compared with 
kinetic operations that produce equivalent damages. For ex-
ample, a cyber attack against a water treatment system in 
Australia caused raw sewage overflows, which in turn caused 
environmental damage – something that also could have been 
achieved with toxic chemicals. Although cyber attacks have 
not yet killed anyone, it is not hard to postulate scenarios 
that do so, for example, attacks that cause extended power 
outages or planes to crash. 
Operations across domains could also be compared in terms 
of decisions made and actions taken, for example, a decision 
to meet an adversary’s demands. ISPs, for example, have re-
moved content from websites they host in order to halt crip-
pling DoS attacks from persons who objected to that content. 
An equivalent operation in physical space might be a protest 
outside a bookstore or library demanding that a particular 
book be removed from the shelves. At a state level, a country 
might agree to the terms of another state as the result of ei-
ther a cyber or kinetic operation.
THE ESTONIAN AND GEORGIAN CYBER WARS
In late April 2007, Russian hackers began a prolonged cyber 
war against Estonia. Prompted by the moving of a Soviet-era 
memorial, the assault in cyberspace included DoS attacks that 
disrupted access to selected Estonian websites belonging to 
the government, banks, and the media. It also included web 
defacements and spamming of government e-mail accounts. 
The cyber strikes went on for weeks, although the vast major-
ity of the DoS attacks lasted less than an hour and only 5.5% 
over ten hours. (1) Some of the DoS attacks leveraged large 
“botnets” of compromised computers, while others involved 
individual participants following a script that performed a 
“ping” attack against target websites. (2) The total cost to the 
assailants was nominal, as participants volunteered their time 
and computers. Attack tools were free, although fees might 
have been paid for some of the botnets. Coordination was 
minimal, generally taking place on web forums frequented by 
Russian hackers. The risks of being caught and punished were 
also low, although one hacker living in Estonia was identified 
and fined about $1,620. (3)
The immediate effects of the cyber war were loss of access 
to certain websites and government e-mail accounts. This in 
turn interfered with the ability of Estonians to make online 
banking transactions, especially from overseas, and to use 
their bank cards for purchases. I found no estimate of the 
total financial losses incurred from the assault, but one bank 
was said to have lost at least $1 million. (4)  Overall, the losses 
likely ran well into the tens of millions of dollars, taking into 
account the service disruptions and the efforts to mitigate, 
stop, and recover from the attacks.
Could the effects of the Estonian cyber attacks have been 
achieved with kinetic weapons at a lower cost? In fact, the 
memorial relocation also sparked low-cost street protests, 
leading to one death and 150 injuries. (5) However, to fairly 
compare the cyber and street actions, we need a generic 
metric, say, total monetary damages. Although I have not 
seen estimates of financial losses for Estonia’s street (or cy-
At the Cyber Command (Provisional) network center at Barksdale Air Force Base, La., Staff Sgts. Benjamin Lockwood (left) and Andrew Corriveau discuss 
operational status. (US Air Force photo/Lance Cheung)
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ber) riots, they are available for other events. The riots in 
Seattle that accompanied the World Trade Organization’s 
meeting in 2000, for example, caused an estimated $20 
million in property damage and lost sales to downtown 
businesses, plus at least $3 million in added city expens-
es to handle the conference. (6) These damages might be 
roughly comparable to those of Estonia’s cyber and street 
riots, but it is hard to say.
Even if the effects of the cyber attacks against Estonia 
exceeded those of the street protests, it is not clear that 
a repeat attack in cyberspace would have as much impact. 
The country’s cyber defenses have been improved, and a 
comparable attack today might be relatively minor, with 
effects substantially less than those of the street riots. 
Compared to the Estonian cyber assault, the one against 
Georgia in August 2008, also attributed to Russian hack-
ers, was much less damaging. One explanation is that be-
cause of Estonia, the Georgians were better prepared. Also, 
the attacks did not persist as long – a few days rather than 
weeks. In addition, Georgia is less dependent on cyber-
space for banking and financial transactions, so the at-
tacks would not have affected day-to-day business as much 
as in Estonia. For Georgia, the Russian military’s invasion 
of its territory had a much greater impact.
CONCLUSIONS
There are few obstacles to engaging in low-level cyber 
warfare, particularly DoS attacks and web defacements. 
Participants can join from anywhere in the world; they 
need little in the way of weapons, skills, and infrastruc-
ture; chances are good they will not be caught or harmed; 
and they might have few reservations about participating 
in activity they view as relatively harmless. However, this 
does not imply that the barriers to entry for cyber war-
fare are lower than for other domains. There are also few 
obstacles to conducting many kinetic operations such as 
street protests, fist fights, and gang warfare. 
The important question is whether equivalent effects 
can be achieved in cyberspace but at a lower cost. To do 
that, operations must be examined in terms of generic ef-
fects that apply across domains, for example, financial 
losses, service disruptions, casualties, or decisions made. 
Only then is it fair to compare costs, which measure barri-
ers to entry. It might have been easier and cheaper for Rus-
sian activists to engage a cyber militia to attack Estonian 
websites than for Iraqi insurgents to engage armed militias 
to attack US forces and each other, but the Iraq violence 
has caused vastly more damage, including substantial loss 
of life.
When examined in terms of equivalent effects, the barri-
ers to entry for cyber operations may, on average, be about 
the same as for kinetic operations. It does not take much 
to cause a few thousand dollars of damages in either do-
main. However, if the knowledge, skills, and disposition of 
individual participants are factored in, there are likely to 
be persons willing and able to inflict that damage through 
a cyber attack but not a kinetic one, and conversely. Some-
one may join a cyber militia who would never participate 
in a traditional militia, while someone else may be more 
attracted to guns and bombs than bits. Thus, rather than 
competing, the two domains of warfare may draw from dif-
ferent constituents and affect different targets. 
Seen from this perspective, cyber warfare opens up a 
new form of warfare to people who otherwise might not 
participate. This is especially evident in al-Qa’ida’s global 
jihad, which includes cyber jihadists who attack websites in 
addition to terrorists who plan and conduct deadly strikes. 
The barriers to entry for electronic jihad may be lower than 
for terrorism, but then the effects pale in comparison to 
the wanton death and destruction of terrorism.
For now, the effects of cyber attacks are relatively minor 
compared to what is achieved with armed forces, especially 
military operations that lead to the overthrow of govern-
ments, seizure of land, and human casualties. The discrep-
ancy may narrow with more sophisticated cyber attacks 
that affect physical systems, but such attacks are likely to 
also have higher costs, raising the barriers to entry.
In the end, there will be different levels of cyber war-
fare, with low barriers to entry for the patriotic and ac-
tivist hackers who just want to cause a bit of disruption, 
not unlike that caused by street demonstrations and other 
kinetic operations with low barriers to entry. The barriers 
to entry will be higher for militaries using cyber strikes to 
achieve national objectives, but whether they will be lower 
or higher than for kinetic strikes that produce comparable 
effects is difficult to say without examining the details of 
specific operations.
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